The author discerns two important trends in V. Putin’s policy in the Northern Caucasus during his presidential term: the attainment of some degree of order and stability largely limited and endangered, however, by the plague of public administration by the state coercive organs’ corrupt, patrimonial and predatory practices. If controlling the means of legitimate violence is central to state building, Putin’s central priority of rebuilding state power must be declared a partial failure. One year before the end of his tenure, the North Caucasus was still highly unstable, and its relative quite is only a comparative success in comparison of the earlier period. The author’s conclusion insists on the fact that the type of essentially predatory state installed by the Kremlin in Chechnya is “the kind most likely to provoke revolution,” and extremely exposed to collapse once external support by Moscow is weakened or withdrawn.

The Redaction
CER: II-7.3.B-601